Subsidy in licensing: Optimality and welfare implications

Chun Hsiung Liao, Debapriya Sen

研究成果: Article同行評審

30 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This paper shows that subsidy can naturally emerge as part of the equilibrium strategy of an innovator of a cost-reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly when the innovator is endowed with combinations of upfront fee and royalty. It is further shown that there are robust regions where the social welfare is higher in subsidy-based licensing compared to the regime where licensing involving subsidy is not allowed. The analysis is carried out for both outsider and incumbent innovators.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)281-299
頁數19
期刊Manchester School
73
發行號3
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2005 六月

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 經濟學與計量經濟學

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