TY - JOUR
T1 - The Effects of China's Development Projects on Political Accountability
AU - Ping, Szu Ning
AU - Wang, Yi Ting
AU - Chang, Wen Yang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press.
PY - 2022/1/2
Y1 - 2022/1/2
N2 - The literature on the relationship between foreign aid and institutions has found that the effects of aid vary across different donor characteristics and delivery mechanisms. This article focuses on China's resource-related development projects, which have been considered controversial due to the relative lack of conditionality. By distinguishing between vertical and horizontal dimensions of political accountability, the study finds that China's resource-related projects are particularly detrimental to the accountability of recipient countries' horizontal (legislative and judicial) institutions. These projects are often delivered to resource-rich countries, in the form of packaging access to resources and infrastructure construction, to improve China's own energy access. Local officials may be tempted to weaken horizontal institutions so that the projects can be implemented quickly. Nevertheless, these projects have little effect on vertical accountability, as China has less intention and capacity to fundamentally restrain electoral competition in recipient countries.
AB - The literature on the relationship between foreign aid and institutions has found that the effects of aid vary across different donor characteristics and delivery mechanisms. This article focuses on China's resource-related development projects, which have been considered controversial due to the relative lack of conditionality. By distinguishing between vertical and horizontal dimensions of political accountability, the study finds that China's resource-related projects are particularly detrimental to the accountability of recipient countries' horizontal (legislative and judicial) institutions. These projects are often delivered to resource-rich countries, in the form of packaging access to resources and infrastructure construction, to improve China's own energy access. Local officials may be tempted to weaken horizontal institutions so that the projects can be implemented quickly. Nevertheless, these projects have little effect on vertical accountability, as China has less intention and capacity to fundamentally restrain electoral competition in recipient countries.
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U2 - 10.1017/S0007123420000381
DO - 10.1017/S0007123420000381
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85097292785
SN - 0007-1234
VL - 52
SP - 65
EP - 84
JO - British Journal of Political Science
JF - British Journal of Political Science
IS - 1
ER -