The sensitivity of compensation to social capital: Family CEOs vs. nonfamily CEOs in the family business groups

Chaur Shiuh Young, Liu Ching Tsai

研究成果: Article同行評審

31 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This study examines the role of CEO social capital, defined as external directorship ties held by the CEO, in determining family vs. nonfamily CEOs' compensation in a network-based business society and governance system. Using a sample of pooled data of family firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) from 2000 to 2002, the empirical results show that CEO social capital is an important determinant in setting nonfamily CEOs' pay level, consistent with the expectation of the contractual governance model. By contrast, as expected by relational governance model, family CEOs' social capital is not incentive-relevant. This study extends the literature on CEO compensation by documenting that in a market where guanxi and connections are considered valuable business tools, corporations will be willing to compensate professional CEOs for the social capital that they bring to the firm.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)363-374
頁數12
期刊Journal of Business Research
61
發行號4
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2008 四月 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Marketing

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