Tightwire of National Interests and Publicity in the Evolved Process of Democratization and Constitutional Transformation: Lessons from Taiwan

Achieving an optimal balance between government secrecy and democratic accountability has led to long-standing questions in the discussion of contemporary constitutionalism. To address the complex contemporary phenomenon of government secrecy within a democratic society, a more in-depth understanding of its tension with democratic accountability and transparency is essential. This article provides a descriptive overview of Taiwan 's legal system, its legal implications in relation to government secrecy, and its normative implications. The article begins with a historical background of Taiwan 's legal system, focusing on legal reform as it relates to government secrecy. The article investigates the complex interactions between the administrative, legislative, and judicial branches 'with regard to the effective control of government classified information. This article argues that the democratization that began in the late 1980s directly facilitated the institutionalization and legalization of national security and intelligence agencies. The analysis identifies two milestones accomplished by Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, each of whom took actions to dismantle the one party-state of the Kuomintang ("KMT") and to implement democratic accountability under constitutionalism. They achieved this by creating an institutional andproactive balance between the competing interests of national security and public information disclosure and transparency. The judiciary tends to give broad respect to the president's authority on diplomatic affairs and intelligence operations, enabling the president to exercise the doctrine of executive privilege. Such judicial deference to the presidency also extends as far as presidents' discretionary entitlement to establish secretfunds to boost overseas intelligence gathering andfacilitate diplomacy