Towards Effective Resource Procurement in MEC: A Resource Re-Selling Framework

Marie Siew, Shikhar Sharma, Kun Guo, Desmond Cai, Wanli Wen, Carlee Joe-Wong, Tony Q.S. Quek

研究成果: Article同行評審

摘要

On-demand and resource reservation pricing models, widely used in cloud computing, are currently used in Multi-Access Edge Computing (MEC). Nevertheless the edge's resources are distributed and each server has lower capacity. If too much resources were reserved in advance, on-demand users may not get their jobs served on time, jeopardizing MEC's latency benefits. Concurrently, reservation plan users may possess un-used quota. Therefore, we propose a sharing platform where reservation plan users can re-sell unused resource quota to on-demand users. To investigate the mobile network operator's (MNO's) incentive of allowing re-selling, we formulate a 3-stage non-cooperative Stackelberg Game and characterize the optimal strategies of buyers and re-sellers. We show that users' actions give rise to 4 different outcomes at equilibrium, dependent on the prices and supply levels of the sharing and on-demand pools. Based on the 4 possible outcomes, we characterise the MNO's optimal prices for on-demand users. Numerical results show that having both pools gives the MNO an optimal revenue when the on-demand pool's supply is low, and unexpectedly, when the MNO's commission is low. We develop an interactive prototype, and show that users' decision distributions in studies on our prototype are similar to that of our decision model.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)82-97
頁數16
期刊IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
17
發行號1
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2024 1月 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 硬體和架構
  • 電腦科學應用
  • 電腦網路與通信
  • 資訊系統與管理

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