Can managerial stock ownership mitigate agency problems?

論文翻譯標題: 經理人持股是否能降低代理問題
  • 尹 立宇

學生論文: Master's Thesis

摘要

The objective of this study is to examine whether managerial stock ownership can mitigate the agency problems Specifically I investigate the link between managerial stock ownership (CEO’s stock holdings) and three corporate policies including cash holdings research and development spending (R&D spending) and debt maturity I find that there is a significant and negative relationship between CEO’s stock holdings and the firm’s cash holding Also I find a significant and positive relationship between CEO’s stock holdings and the firm’s R&D spending In addition I document a negative relationship between CEO’s stock holdings and long-term debt These results suggest that managerial stock ownership can be effective in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders and thus mitigating agency problems
獎項日期2015 七月 15
原文English
監督員Ping-Hsun Huang (Supervisor)

引用此

'