CEO turnover and audit pricing: Further evidence from China

摘要

This study tests the relationship between CEO turnover in client companies and the fees charged by their audit firms and whether SOEs can attenuate the relationship We propose that forced CEO turnover brings higher business and audit risks for the audit firm and ultimately leads to higher audit prices On the other hand we propose that auditors may face lower risk in engagement due to SOEs’ characteristic We develop two regression model of audit fees that includes as predictor variables type of CEO turnover SOE dummy and the interaction terms form them plus some control variables identified in prior studies (e g ROA total assets and corporate governance) Results show that companies with forced CEO turnover have significantly higher audit fees than companies with either voluntary turnover or no turnover Further we find auditors charge lower audit fees when forced CEO turnover is occurred in SOEs

獎項日期	2015 7月 21
原文	English
監督員	Hua-Wei Huang (Supervisor)